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Every colour theory begs a space theory. A main aim of the space theory is to catch 
the core of knowledge: through knowing something we can know the world outside of 
us. This thesis is to illustrate a different way of defining colour by introducing a 
phenomenological way of talking about space. This question will thus be answered: 
why is colour a quality of an object and at the same time a content of sensation of 
subject? Thus a solution probably is that colour is a phenomenological bridge of 
objects and subjects. Some philosophers, who hold a standpoint of physicalism may 
argue that all mental states and activities can be reduced thoroughly to physical states 
and activities. Another claim would be that all sensations are the results of the 
activities of brain nerves. But in the following paragraphs I will analyse why a colour 
theory with the standpoint of physicalism cannot explain away colour. A 
phenomenological view of colour will therefore emphasize the necessity of the 
independence of mental activities, in other words, sensations and perceptions, which 
give rise to a better explanation of colour. 
